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LONG-RANGE PLANS ON JAPAN NEEDED TO ASSIST MacARTHUR

AMID the mounting discussion of American Far Eastern policy one fact stands out: the American public is largely convinced that the defeat of Japan does not mean the end of Tokyo's aggressive aspirations. It is true that Japan will soon be confined to its home islands, standing alone without the means of waging war, and hemmed in geographically by the world's two leading powers, the United States and Russia. But there is widespread feeling, derived partly from our experience with Germany after World War I, that purely technical measures directed at Japan's war-making capacity will have to be accompanied by fundamental changes in Japan's social, economic and political structure if there is to be a chance of lasting peace.

U.S. POLICY STIFFENS. It is evident that our grip on Japan is not yet strong enough to allow us complete freedom of action for, as General MacArthur emphasized on September 14, the occupation is in its first stage. With only a portion of our troops ashore and large numbers of Japanese soldiers still armed, the need to safeguard the American forces has been a major consideration. On the other hand, perhaps partly as a result of growing American concern over the maneuvers of Premier Higashi-Kuni's régime, General MacArthur has taken strong measures in recent days, stressing that "the surrender terms are not soft, and they will not be applied in kid-glove fashion."

He has ordered the dissolution of Imperial General Headquarters and the notorious Black Dragon Society, has imposed sharp restrictions on the Japanese press and radio, and has ordered the newspapers to publish accounts of Japanese war atrocities so that the civilian population may know some of the crimes committed in its name. The arrest of the first group of war criminals is being carried through, and on September 15 an Army spokesman for General Mac-

Arthur castigated leaders of the news industry for abusing the latitude granted them. He accused them of coloring the news, engaging in destructive criticism of the Allies, and giving the impression that we have been negotiating with the Japanese government. On the latter point he declared emphatically: "The Supreme Commander will dictate orders to the Japanese government. He will not negotiate with it."

HOW LONG AN OCCUPATION? These statements indicate General MacArthur's agreement with the American press and public in finding recent Japanese propaganda disturbing and repugnant. Undoubtedly the actions he has already taken will be followed by other essential technical measures, such as the dissolution of the Japanese General Staffs and the War and Navy Ministries, as soon as these steps are feasible. What is still unclear, despite reports of plans for reeducating the Japanese, is the long-range character of American policy—whether the United States will be satisfied simply to disarm Japan technically or will seek far-reaching alterations in Japanese society, such as are envisaged in Germany.

The length of American occupation of Japan will be a major and possibly a decisive determinant of policy, for it is clear that only a superficial demilitarization could be carried out in a brief period. It is now four and a half months since the defeat of Germany, but the process of reorganizing that country is still in its early stages, so great are the problems that face the occupying powers. The fact that the trials of the top Nazi war criminals may not begin for some time suggests the difficulties before us in both Europe and Asia. In Japan, to be sure, our burden is somewhat lighter than in Germany, because we do not have to build a government from the ground up, but the existence of the Japanese administrative structure with its own ingrained tendencies may increase the difficulty of reaching our objectives.

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It is only natural for the American troops in Japan to be eager to return home, and General MacArthur has indicated that in the next six months many of them will do so. But the American people have paid heavily for Japanese aggression and there is no reason to doubt their willingness to meet the far smaller cost of occupying Japan long enough to make victory stick. A carefully coordinated policy of explaining our aims to our troops in Japan, providing adequately for their participation in achieving these purposes, and looking after their personal well-being, should result in satisfactory morale.

WHERE SHOULD POLICY BE MADE? Recent events in Korea suggest that the issue of control of occupation policy also requires discussion. When the first American forces landed in southern Korea on September 9, the commanding officer, Lieut.-Gen. John R. Hodge, stated that for lack of any alternative the Japanese administration would be maintained from the Governor-General down. Subsequently, protest demonstrations broke out in Seoul, the Korean capital, and considerable criticism was expressed in this country. On September 12 President

Truman declared that the decision had been made entirely by the theater commander. On the same day General Hodge announced that both the Governor-General and the Japanese director of the police bureau had been removed.

It is obvious that at the moment of the landing General Hodge was in no position to replace the Japanese administration. But it is equally clear from the speedy removal, after protest, of the two Japanese officials most objectionable to the Koreans that the situation could have been avoided had there been adequate direction from Washington. General MacArthur has carried out his occupation assignment effectively and has shown a commendable interest in the reactions of the American public. But it seems unfair and generally undesirable to expect him to develop on the spot policies that require long-range planning. While the Supreme Commander needs a considerable degree of freedom to exercise his own judgment, his responsibilities would be eased and his usefulness increased if he received a greater measure of guidance from home.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

WILL DIVERGENT ECONOMIC VIEWS UNDERMINE U.S.-BRITISH UNITY?

While the agenda of the current Anglo-American economic conference in Washington includes such technical subjects as lend-lease termination, loans, and commercial policy, there are several underlying questions which must be canvassed if any agreement reached for aid to Britain is to prove acceptable either to Congress or the British Labor government. Since Britain's present economic crisis is a direct result of the war, the question arises whether the United States has a moral responsibility to aid the British economy at this time. In so far as this query involves a judgment on sharing war costs, it applies not only to Britain but also to France, Russia and other United Nations now facing serious food shortages or other economic difficulties. In addition, however, it may be asked whether there are reasons based purely on self-interest—economic or political—which make it necessary for the United States to devise some peacetime plan similar to the lend-lease arrangements to facilitate Britain's economic reconstruction.

For many Americans the question of aid to Britain is complicated by the fact that the British government is pledged to a program of social-economic reconstruction which is considerably further left than any policy now favored in the United States. Fears about Labor's program of socialization were voiced in Congress the moment the Anglo-American talks began. On September 11, for example, Representative Knutson, Republican of Minnesota, stated that it was inconceivable that "President Truman and the Congress will permit billions to be taken out of the American Treasury and given to foreign countries

to be used for expropriation of privately owned and operated property, especially in view of the depleted condition of our own Treasury."

MORAL DUTY AND SELF-INTEREST. The most cursory review of the difficulties encountered over the war-debt controversy resulting from World War I should warn us against any attempt to strike an exact balance of war costs shared in a military coalition effort. President Truman's assurance that America would not expect a cash repayment for the lend-lease outlay of \$42 billion indicates that we have learned a lesson from the inter-war experience. In the original lend-lease contract, the United States recognized Britain's sacrifices in its two-year struggle against the Axis before we entered the war, and admittedly purchased our own defense by that act. What is more important now, in view of the question currently raised about our responsibility in continuing aid to Britain, is that the master lend-lease agreements provided terms of settlement which strike a neat balance between moral obligations and self-interest.

Just as lend-lease was based on recognition of mutual interests, an adjustment of the economic problems resulting from the war must be made on the basis of mutual advantage. Properly understood, such an adjustment involves no new moral decisions. For the terms of the lend-lease contract suggest a settlement which seeks to increase trade and raise world economic standards. Britain's economy, which was in large part devoted to war purposes, must now be revamped and expanded. This will prove doubly difficult because a major portion of Britain's foreign

investments was liquidated in the war years in order to finance the military effort. Funds are no longer available abroad by which the necessary differences between the country's export receipts and its import needs can be balanced. Yet the British people are intent on materially raising their standard of living. And unless conditions are provided in which the nation's economy may expand in cooperation with other nations, Britain may be forced to continue and increase its preferential trading restrictions which American business finds irksome, especially in the sterling-area countries.

It must be hoped that the United States-British partnership, having weathered a coalition war with such excellent results, can avoid the kind of disintegration that befell a similar Anglo-French alliance in 1919. Since our political aims are in many ways alike, it will be all the more tragic if economic differences prevent continued cooperation in the post-war period. Such an understanding need not take on the character of an exclusive Anglo-American bloc, but it is only realistic to admit that wider cooperation among the United Nations, either in political or economic affairs, can hardly succeed if the United States and Britain are to pursue opposing policies. The United Nations conference on economic problems, so often proposed, would have scant chance of success if the present negotiations do not bring about substantial results.

FEAR OF LABOR'S PROGRAM. The fundamental question asked by many Americans is, Need we fear Labor's program of nationalization? President Truman's answer that Britain's choice of government is entirely a domestic British issue, while quite true, will hardly allay the qualms of those who fear encroachments on free enterprise in America.

Characteristic socialist statements made in England by some of Labor's spokesmen who foretell the end of capitalism will not go unheeded here. Moreover, given common economic practices founded on the common structure of Anglo-American law, changes in Britain's economic system will be readily understood by Americans in a way similar changes in less familiar countries might not be understood. Our very ability fully to grasp the changes Labor intends to make in an economic system so nearly like our own may be turned to our advantage if meantime we are not impeded by self-engendered fears.

Just as several individual states in America have proved laboratories of social experimentation, Britain provides a test case which may prove of value to us. It is noteworthy that the recent election victory in Britain brings labor to power for the first time fully supported by a large majority in an industrial nation of the first rank which is both highly skilled technologically and possesses a tried and honest civil service. Heretofore socialist plans have been undertaken either in small or economically backward nations. Neither situation has offered an example to the United States. Britain's experiment, at a time when extensive social benefits are being urged for all citizens in this country, is of urgent interest to the United States. If it is realized that our own system is a mixed economy increasingly concerned with problems of social welfare, then the British experiment need not prove an obstacle to American aid. For British Laborites are operating within a traditional political framework of democratic procedures and liberties which we share, and their proposed economic structure differs from our own only in degree.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

(The second of two articles.)

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

The Vigil of a Nation, by Lin Yutang. New York, John Day, 1945. \$2.75

The story of the author's six months' trip to China in 1943-44. A combination of chapters on travel and a defense of the Chungking government's position in its political and military conflict with the Chinese Communists.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1943-June 1944, edited by Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1945. \$3.75

Sixth volume in a most valuable series which makes readily accessible documents that really show how America heads toward the post-war world.

Generals in the White House, by Dorothy B. and Julius Goebel, Jr. Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1945. \$2.75

A brief survey of the military and political careers of nine Generals who have been Presidents of the United States.

The Real Soviet Russia, by David Dallin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944. \$3.50

An analysis of the character of the Russian government, secret police, army and Communist party by one of the leading critics of the Soviet régime.

Strangers in India, by Penderel Moon. New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945. \$2.00

A refreshing account based on the author's experiences as an English official in the Indian Civil Service. Mr. Moon brings out the sense of frustration felt by Englishmen who realize that British conceptions are not suitable to Indian conditions.

Canada and the Fight for Freedom, by W. L. Mackenzie King. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. \$2.75


This volume contains the more important speeches of the Prime Minister of Canada delivered between September 1941 and June 1944.

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Washington News Letter



PUBLIC DISTURBED BY CONFUSED POLICY ON FEEDING EUROPE

In his statement of September 17, answering queries raised by a number of national organizations, President Truman—contradicting a previous statement by Secretary Anderson about food—said that both ships and supplies (with the notable exception of sugar, fats and oil) are available, but that satisfactory financial arrangements remain to be made with individual paying governments and with UNRRA, adding: "This does not mean that it may not become necessary to resume ration controls of certain items if they become so short in supply that such controls are required to insure more equitable distribution." The American people, once they are acquainted with the grim facts of near-starvation in Allied countries, will unquestionably agree with the President that "it is an American responsibility not only to our friends, but to ourselves," to see that the job of feeding "is done and done quickly." But the only way that this can apparently be done is if we supply food on a basis other than cash.

AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP. The President has the political choice now of asking the American public to go on accepting enforced restrictions in its diet or of disappointing the hopes he has raised abroad. The only assurance that a share of our foodstuffs will be diverted to hungry foreign nations is the uninterrupted application of ration and price controls. The extensive needs of other countries for imports from the United States call for an orderly distribution that cannot be arranged if buyers here and abroad are competing without restriction for available supplies. Individual western European countries want to make purchases of food in this country. Britain must obtain by purchase or loan a quantity of food equal at least to the amount it was receiving under lend-lease until that service was terminated on August 21. UNRRA is buying food here for distribution in southern and central Europe, as well as certain Far Eastern areas. On August 30, moreover, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said it will be necessary to export food from the United States to feed Germany this winter.

In the face of these varied calls on the larder of the United States, conflicting statements of government officials have thrown both Americans and foreigners into confusion concerning the Administration's intentions. Secretary Anderson has consistently discouraged expectations of filling foreign requirements, while diplomatic spokesmen like former Under Secretary of State Grew have said that it is vitally necessary to come as close as possible to filling them.

Secretary Anderson on July 12 declared the United States "cannot feed the world," although, he added, we must share what we can with the peoples of the liberated lands "until such time as their new harvests will make it possible for them again to feed themselves." In explanation of the limited contribution that this country could make, he pointed out, "we are eating into our reserve stocks of meat, poultry, eggs, sugar, lard and canned goods." On September 14, when he announced that he would seek an end to controls on citrus fruits, the country, according to government reports, had an excess of many foods, and the Federal government was releasing from warehouses 3,000,000 cases of canned fruits and 6,000,000 cases of canned vegetables to civilian purchasers.

DESPERATE NEED ABROAD. On September 15 the Office of War Information reported that the liberated areas of Europe desperately need 12,000,000 tons of foodstuff imports in order to prevent widespread starvation this winter. European food production is 10 per cent below the levels of 1935-37, and transportation troubles make impossible the most useful distribution of what is produced. The United States, on the other hand, is producing far in excess of pre-war normal, and is the chief potential source of supply. The Soviet Union, which itself is seeking aid from the United States in other foods, has exported grain for relief to Rumania, Yugoslavia and Poland; and Sweden is developing a program of assistance to liberated countries. Canada, which with the United States is the chief supplier of UNRRA, has announced the restoration of meat rationing.

The OWI report disclosed that UNRRA has been so unsuccessful in filling its relief food needs for Europe that Director General Herbert H. Lehman has had to lower from 2,650 to 2,000 the calories he hoped to provide daily to UNRRA beneficiaries. Lehman in June estimated his meat needs for the final six months of 1945 at 725,000,000 pounds, but he has obtained deliveries on only 44,000,000. During a visit to Washington in July the French Minister of Food Supply, Christian Pineau, said that the current French ration averaged 1,500 calories a day, or less than the famishing quantities supplied by the Japanese to American prisoners of war. The American public wants not only the facts about the dire food situation in Europe and Asia but an opportunity to take action commensurate with the urgency of the crisis described by President Truman.

BLAIR BOLLES